see · yfra north noemic phantom anonymous lexicon
volume ix · pages 148–151 · ed. l. m.
a small problem in logic and linguistics: how to refer to a person who is, in principle, never present. four solutions, three of them inadequate.
The yfra problem is the question, in logic and linguistics, of how to refer in language to a person, place, or thing whose only property is non-presence. The problem takes its name from the north noemic word yfra, the household referent for the always-mentioned, never-seen relative. The problem is small but recurrent: it surfaces in grammars of the absent (the vocative-absent of north noemic), in the logic of phantoms in the keeper's register, in the question of how one writes a letter to a recipient who does not exist, and in telemata generally.
The naive solution is to treat the yfra as a referring expression with no referent and to declare the problem unworthy of language. This is the position of certain analytic philosophers and most census-takers. It is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the yfra is in fact used — it occurs in sentences, supports anaphora, and admits of agreement — and any account that calls these uses incoherent owes the speakers an apology. Second, the yfra does not behave like the empty name in fiction: it is not the case that yfra does not exist; it is the case that yfra is not here.
The second solution. A second solution, sometimes called the chair solution, holds that the yfra is referred to via a proxy — an empty chair, a folded coat, a teacup laid for nobody. The proxy is the referent. The reference is to the chair, not to the person. This is satisfactory in households (the chair is concrete) and unsatisfactory in logic (the language clearly refers to a person, not to a piece of furniture). It also fails the test of multi-yfra households, in which a single chair is inadequate.
The third solution. The third, the vocative-absent solution, accepts the north-noemic grammar at its own valuation: the yfra is a person, but the form of reference is unique. The grammar admits the address; the logic accepts that the address is unanswered; the household sets the place. This is the solution preferred by the dialect's speakers. It is unsatisfactory only to logicians who require completeness of their cases.
The fourth solution. The fourth, the editor's, is to accept that the yfra problem is not a problem to be solved but a small permanent feature of any language that takes hospitality seriously. The household sets a place because a household with no extra places is not yet a household. The language has a vocative-absent because the language is spoken by people who would rather speak to someone who is not there than say no one is missing. The yfra is the figure of speech that holds the door open.